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Abstract 
25 
The transit industry relies on overtime to fill in for worker absence or to cover 
unexpected extra work. The purpose of this article is to study the absence conse-
quences of overtime in the transit industry through a disaggregate model of absence. 
The model was estimated with panel data of transit operators to test the hypothesis that 
widespread availability of overtime may induce absence. This might occur for two rea-
sons. Some employees may be more likely to be absent after reaching a threshold pay 
amount for a period, and this level will be reached after fewer hours on the job if over-
time work is readily available. Other employees may be absent more because of the 
increased stress and fatigue associated with regularly working long hours including 
overtime. The results suggest that absence is more a habit than the result of a decision 
process based on past overtime worked. 
Introduction 
The transit industry relies on overtime to fill in for worker absence or to 
cover unexpected extra work. The importance of service reliability and the 
uncertainty about both the workforce available and the amount of work to be 
performed at a given time in the transit industry leads to the employment of 
more workers than those actually scheduled for work. Too large a workforce 
will result in low productivity, since some employees who do not have any use-
ful work to perform must still be paid. Reducing the workforce size will require 
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more overtime. Since it is common in the transit industry to provide substantial 
fringe benefits for employees but only small marginal benefits for working 
overtime (beyond the typical pay premium), it is not unusual for the total cost 
per hour of labor produced by an employee working overtime to be similar to 
that for an employee working regular time. This situation may lead to a policy 
of relying heavily on overtime to fill in for absent employees and to cover extra 
work requirements. 
There are two reasons why this naive "cost-minimizing" solution might be 
inappropriate. First, frequently employees have the right to decline overtime 
work if they so choose, and the greater the reliance on overtime, the larger the 
number of situations in which no employees will be available and willing to 
work overtime, thus potentially significantly affecting service reliability. 
Second, if large amounts of overtime are worked, there may be an increase in 
levels of absence among the workforce. This might occur for two reasons. 
Some employees may be more likely to be absent after reaching a threshold pay 
amount for a period, and this level will be reached after fewer hours on the job 
if overtime work is readily available. Other employees may be absent more 
because of the increased stress and fatigue associated with regularly working 
long hours including overtime. In many properties, straight runs can be as long 
as 9 or 10 hours. The union contract usually requires that the longest duties go 
to regular operators who can also work overtime. This can result in operators 
working up to 13 or 14 hours per day and receiving up to 17 hours of equiva-
lent straight-time pay. This has resulted in a great deal of stress on the operator 
in some properties. 
Several papers have explored the general relationships between absence 
and overtime, some finding positive correlation between these two variables 
(Martin 1971; Gowler 1969), with others finding no such relationship (Buck 
and Shimmin 1959; Flanagan et al. 1974). Within the transit industry few stud-
ies found positive relationships between absence and overtime work including 
Perry (1983), Leahy, Sprague, and Schlegel (1979), Brown (1981) (as cited by 
Perry 1983 ), and Perin ( 1984 ); one study (Smith et al. 1980) found no such rela-
tionships. Considering that all these studies used either aggregate or weak mea-
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sures of absence or overtime, or small samples, further study is required to 
resolve the relationship between overtime availability and absence. 
This article examines the absence consequences of overtime in the transit 
industry. If reliance on overtime creates more absence, then the direct cost of 
the employee working overtime will be less than the full cost of the overtime. 
Understanding the full cost of overtime is essential to the decision on work-
force sizing as shown by strategic workforce planning models (Koutsopoulos 
and Wilson 1987; Hickman et al.1988; and Shiftan and Wilson 1994). This 
issue is of special interest today because many industries are aggressively 
downsizing their workforce. 
This article presents a case study based on the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority (MBTA) to study this problem. The cost structure in 
which an hour of overtime costs the agency less than an hour of an extra oper-
ator is true for the MBTA because the high cost of fringe benefits that apply to 
employees working regular time outweighs the 50 percent pay premium for 
overtime work. The researchers test the hypothesis that widespread overtime 
availability may induce absence versus the alternative hypothesis that absence 
is more a result of individual characteristics through a disaggregate model of 
employee absence. The next section presents the development of a theoretical 
framework for exploring the relationship between overtime and absence, 
assuming absence results from a decision process using the income-leisure 
trade-off model. 
The Income-Leisure Trade-off Model 
Subjective cost/benefit or income/leisure evaluation by the employee is 
known as the income-leisure trade-off in workforce participation. Under this 
theory, the employee evaluates the economic and social benefits of work atten-
dance versus leisure time and acts accordingly. Holding work schedule flexi-
bility constant, the researchers analyze the work attendance decision within the 
conventional labor-leisure choice framework. Workers maximize a utility 
function containing consumption (X) and leisure (L): 
U = U(X, L) (l) 
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The worker faces two constraints, a time constraint and a budget con-
straint. Including both absence and overtime as decision variables, the time 
constraint can be written as: 
t-f-t-t0 =0 
where: 
t represents the total time in the period under consideration, 
r is the contracted number of work hours, 
(2) 
t is leisure hours not including absence hours (L = t + r where r is 
absence hours), and 
f is the amount of overtime worked. The budget constraint is: 
R + w(f - f) + w* t0 - D(f) - X = 0 
where: 
R is income from sources other than work, 
w is the wage rate, 
w* is the overtime pay rate, and 
D is a lump sum penalty for absence. 
(3) 
In practice, this penalty will be observed as a decreased probability of 
receiving a promotion or merit wage increase and an increased likelihood of 
being suspended or dismissed. The assumption is that the worker is not paid for 
absence hours. Substitution of Equations 2 and 3 into Equation I and differen-
tiation with respect to r and f produce the following first-order equilibrium 
conditions: 
UL - (w + D)Ux = 0 (4) 
(5) 
where: 
Uk indicates the partial derivative of U with respect to k = L, X. 
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The first condition indicates that a worker will be absent on any given day 
if the extra leisure is more valuable than the sum of the wages he or she would 
have earned that day and the associated loss in future earnings. This means that 
the shadow price of leisure time for absent workers is greater than the contract-
ed wage. The second condition indicates that an employee is willing to work 
overtime as long as the overtime wage is more valuable than the extra leisure. 
If the value of extra leisure is less than the overtime wage but more than 
the sum of the regular wage and the resultant loss in future earnings, then the 
employee would be willing both to take absence and to work overtime. The 
value of leisure may vary from day to day, resulting in employees opting for 
both overtime and absence over some period. 
This analysis suggests that the absence model should include overtime o 
and the overtime wage rate w* and can be written as: 
a= a(w, r, f, D,f, o, w*) 
where: 
/ is the schedule flexibility permitted. 
(6) 
The focus of this model is on voluntary absence that is a function of the 
worker's motivation to attend work, as opposed to involuntary absence that 
results from inability, rather than unwillingness, to attend work. Voluntary 
absence may also be a function of involuntary absence in prior periods. Even 
if the operator has other duties or was injured and had an involuntary absence, 
he or she still had a break from the routine of the job and the attendant stress 
and might be less inclined to take a voluntary absence in the following periods. 
Overtime and absence over a period together define the individual trade-
off between leisure and income. If the worker has been absent too much in one 
period, in the sense that he or she ends the period "underemployed," the indi-
vidual may tend to be absent less in the next period to recoup lost income. If 
on the other hand, the worker is "overemployed" in one period because of 
working overtime, he or she may tend to be absent in the following period to 
gain more leisure. This is consistent with Fichman's (1984) dynamic model of 
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attendance, in which absence is one observable consequence of changing the 
allocation of time and effort from work to nonwork activity, and suggests that 
absences should be modeled dynamically, by letting the absence in period t be 
a function of absence and overtime in prior periods. Each individual has his or 
her own target point in terms of the income-leisure trade-off. Assuming that 
each individual has a constant target point over time, this unobserved charac-
teristic can be modeled by the individual history of absence and overtime over 
a relatively long period. In addition, differences in operator characteristics can 
be captured by operator-specific dummy variables that should be significant if 
absence is a habit. Finally, temporal variation can be accou~ted for by season-
al dummy variables that can test, for example, if there are higher absence rates 
in the summer when leisure time may have a higher value. All these effects and 
variables in the model can be written as: 
Otv = a(w, r, tC, d,f, o, w*, Aai, Aav, Oa, a •. l,i, a •. l,v, o, _ i, a •. 2,I, at. 2,v, o •. 2, ... , 
operi, ... , season1, season2, ••• ) 
where: 
at, v =voluntary absence in period t, 
at _ k, i = involuntary absence in period t - k, 
Aai = mean amount of past involuntary absence per period, 
Aav = mean amount of past voluntary absence per period, 
Oa = average overtime over the n periods before t, 
Aa = average absence over the n periods before t, 
(7) 
operi = dummy variables equal 1 for operator i and O for all other operators, 
seasoni = dummy variables equal 1 for season i, and O for any other season. 
111e Income-Leisure 111eory In the Transit Industry 
Several factors may make the income-leisure theory more significant in 
the transit industry than in some other industries: 
I) Widespread availability of overtime may allow some employees to 
quickly recoup wages lost to absence, diminishing the economic bene-
fits of regular work attendance. 
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2) Scheduling inflexibility reduces the operator's opportunity to take time 
off when needed or desired. Some operators may then use sick leave as 
a means to obtain time off. 
3)Management's inability to schedule personnel effectively results in an 
endless cycle in which operators work overtime and then take time off 
to compensate, resulting in more absence, and thus in more overtime 
work, etc. 
4)The extraboard encourages employee absence because employees are 
aware that replacements are available for them. This problem may be 
exacerbated or perpetuated by the common practice of basing the current 
size of the extraboard on past levels of employee absence. 
5) Occupational stress associated with working long and irregular hours 
may also induce absence. Occupational stress is not included as a sepa-
rate variable in this model because it is very difficult to measure. 
However, stress is included in the model implicitly under the assumption 
that working overtime may increase stress. 
The MBTA Case Study 
In this section, the absence model is applied using data from the MBIA. 
The sample consists of274 operators from all bus and trolley garages. The data 
include number of absence hours each day for each operator, the category of 
each absence, and the weekly payment for overtime worked during a period of 
one year. 
The absences are classified into three groups: 
!)voluntary absences (unauthorized absence) which are not paid; 
2) involuntary absences ( death in the family, industrial accident, military or 
jury duty, and excused) which are paid; and 
3) sick absences which are not paid for the first day of the absence but are 
paid for any subsequent day. 
Sick absences are a separate category because while it includes real sick-
ness that should be considered involuntary, it may also be a way for an opera-
tor to take a voluntary absence. Overtime payment is on a daily basis for any 
time worked above 8 hours. This means that an operator can receive overtime 
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compensation without working 40 hours a week and that an operator can both 
receive overtime compensation and be absent in the same week. The overtime 
pay rate is 1.5 times the base wage rate, but there are no fringe benefits charged 
to overtime. 
Table 1 summarizes the absence and overtime variables, including the 
number of zero values for one of the seven MBTA garages. In this dataset, each 
observation corresponds to an operator weekly record. 
Table 1 
Summary of Absence and Overtime Data 
M SD % of observed 
(hr/wk) (hr/wk) values= 0 
Absence 
Voluntary 0.12 1.90 99.3 
Involuntary 0.59 3.86 95.5 
Sick 1.50 5.90 89.5 
Total 2.20 7.27 84.9 
Overtime 0.65 1.86 79.5 
As seen from Table 1, the occurrence of voluntary absence is very low-
less than 10 percent of all absences. To explore whether some sick absences 
might be better classified as voluntary absences, Table 2 shows the duration of 
sick absences for a sample garage. 
In light of the very high percentage of one-day sick absences and to model 
voluntary absences more realistically, the researchers defined new absence 
variables as follows: 
• Short: any voluntary absence plus any single-day sick absence. 
• Long: any sick absence that consists of at least two consecutive days. 
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Tobie 2 
Frequencies of Sick Absences 
Days Frequency Percent 
l 279 62.3 
2 55 12.3 
3 26 5.8 
4 48 10.7 
5 40 8.9 
The assumption is that most long sick absences are genuine and most 
short sick absences are really voluntary. Clearly, some short absences will real-
ly be involuntary, while some long absences may be voluntary, but there is no 
more reliable way to distinguish between the two. These categories are also 
consistent with the payment category: Long absences are paid ( except the first 
day) while short ones are not. A model for short absence is consistent with the 
theoretical model, which assumes that absences are not paid. 
In this study, duration rather than frequency was used as the absence mea-
sure because it is more consistent with the theoretical model. It is the duration of 
an absence rather than frequency that determines income. The researchers used 
a time unit of one week because they do not expect the hypothesized relation-
ships to exist on a daily level, and analyzing longer periods may cause loss of 
important information. Wages at the MBTA are paid weekly, which also suggests 
that a week is an appropriate period for analysis, as this is the shortest period of 
perceived income for the operator. The model was estimated using the tobit 
model developed for censored data (Maddala 1983), as in this case clearly no 
employee can be absent a negative number of hours. 
Model Estimation Results 
The researchers estimated separate models for each garage because, even 
though absence and overtime policies are the same across all garages, their 
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enforcement and application may vary. Classifying absence into the different cat-
egories may vary, as may the relationship between supervisors and operators. 
Three different time-based explanatory variables were used for each 
absence category as well as for overtime. The definitions below are for the long 
variable but similar definitions hold for the short, the involuntary (invol), and 
overtime ( ot) variables: 
• Long_ 1 is the amount of long absence in the immediately preceding week. 
• Long_234 is the average long absence during preceding weeks 2 through 4. 
• Longyast is the average long absence during preceding weeks 5 through 
16. 
• Winter, Spring, and Summer are seasonal dummy variables. 
• Oper _i,i=l,2, . .. n are operator-specific dummy variables. 
Table 3 shows the estimation results for each garage including the dummy 
variables for the first 16 operators in each garage, which are representative of 
the remaining results. 
The main conclusions from the estimation are: 
• Most of the explanatory power is due to the operator-specific dummy vari-
ables, for which virtually all coefficients were significant ( only 9 out of the 
274 dummy operator coefficients were not significant) with t-statistics 
between -1.9 and -5.5. To test the hypotheses that the constant is not generic, 
the researchers ran a nested hypothesis test comparing this model to a restrict-
ed model. The results showed that for all garages the test statistic ( with values 
in the range of 64-100) was larger than the chi square at 1 percent significance 
(with values between 60 and 63) and therefore the null hypothesis that the 
operator-specific dummy coefficients are equal can be rejected. 
• The lagged overtime variables are all insignificant and most are negative, 
suggesting that those who tend to work overtime tend not to be absent. 
• Short_ 1 always has a positive coefficient which is generally significant. 
This is because some short absences in any week are continuations of 
absence in the preceding week. The long_ 1 variable also has a significant 
positive coefficient for the same reason. 
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Table 3 
Toe Short Absence Model 
Garage Garage Garage Garage Garage Garage Garage 
122 123 125 126 128 129 132 
shortf-1) 0.689 0.610 0.331 0.475 0.787 0.408 0.707 
(4.21) (4.48) (1.54) (2.17) (5.66) (2.85) (4.26) 
short_234 -1.074 -0.383 -0.454 0.007 0.165 0.242 0.211 
(-2.82) (-1.66) {-0.90) (0.03) {0.84) (1.10) (0.96) 
short_past -4.321 -1.410 -3.202 -1.230 -1.324 -2.458 -0.949 
{-3.93) (-2.56) {-2.55) (-2.12) (-2.85) (-4.12) (-2. )4) 
Long(-1) 0.154 0.446 0.46) 0.475 0.323 0.336 0.149 
(1.79) (5.90) (3.36) {5.65) (3.70) (3.12) ( 1.42) 
Long_234 -0.093 -0.152 -1.343 0.030 -0.239 0.320 -0.29') 
(-0.70) (-1.28) (-2.42) (0.21) (-1.63) (1.99) (-l.87) 
l.ong_past 0.218 0.275 -2.040 -0.279 0.255 -0.212 -0.224 
(0.80) (1.36) (-2.32) (-1.07) (1.25) (-0.94) (-1.35) 
invol(-1) -0.306 0.136 0.399 -0.012 -0.145 -0.29') -0.222 
(-2.29) (1.26) (2.21) (-0.07) (-0.82) (-1.37) (-1.89) 
invo1_234 -0.041 -0.242 -0.463 0.088 0.149 -0.152 -0.081 
(-0.30) (-l.68) (-1.57) (0.46) (0.86) (-0.76) (-0.62) 
invol_past 0.124 -0.239 0.621 -0.035 0.298 0.315 -0.436 
(0.53) (-1.43) (1.63) (-0.l 1) (1.26) (1.78) {-2.50) 
Ot -0.010 -0.014 -0.018 -0.005 -0.029 0.012 -0.000 
(-0.94) (-1.15) (-1.00) (-0.43) (-1.66) (1.20) (-0.84) 
ot(-1) -0.014 -0.001 -0.011 0.018 -0.003 -0.014 -0.001 
(-1.29) (-0.11) (-0.65) (1.45) (-0.16) (-1.03) (-0.16) 
ot_234 -0.014 0.009 -0.0045 -0.023 -0.045 0.0088 0.003 
(-0.95) (0.63) (-0.20) (-1.00) (-1.64) (0.5)) (0.22) 
ot_pmt -0.013 -0.042 0.0008 -0.047 -0.087 -0.032 0.011 
(-0.44) (-1.55) (0.02) (-1.19) (-1.59) (-0.82) (0.56) 
Winter90 1.778 -2.408 -3.193 -0.538 -2.462 0.316 1.150 
(0.96) (-1.36) (-1.47) (-0.30) (-1.47) (0.16) l0.58) 
Spring90 1.419 -0.567 -0.758 -0.387 -1.981 -0.732 4.565 
(0.86) (-0.38) (-0.42) {-0.26) {-1.40) {-0.42) (2.53) 
Summer90 5.738 -2.015 3.292 -0.457 -2.026 -1.223 4.892 
(3.03) (-1.24) (1.74) (-0.28) (-1.35) (-0.63) (2.54) 
Oper 1 -20.841 -15.788 -25.782 -24.073 -23.830 -16.085 -24.780 
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(-3.17) (-4.41) (-3.80) (-4.93) (-4.41) (-3.96) (-4.50) 
Oper_2 -9.892 -19.352 -22.197 -12.493 -15.469 -12.361 -30.827 
(-2.93) (-4.80) (-4.93) (-3.92) (-3.94) (-3.51) (-4.35) 
Oper_3 -23.776 -9.134 -11.449 -19.005 -24.075 -27.970 -27.583 
(-3.75) (-2.99) (-3.19) (-4.38) (-4.47) (-4.49) (-4.81) 
Oper_4 -12.199 -18.496 -24.791 -15.137 -15.949 -23;()63 -29.624 
(-3.04) (-4.61) (-4.84) (-4.15) (-4.06) (-4.48) (-5.08) 
Oper_S -16.650 -25.333 -24.460 -24.386 -15.130 -27.732 -30.420 
(-4.44) (-4.38) (-3.63) (-4.53) (-4.36) (-4.86) (-4.10) 
Ope_r_6 -21.194 -17.057 -21.628 -18.909 -18.233 -21.323 -30.716 
(-4.74) (-4.33) (-4.19) (-4.77) (-4.68) (-4.77) (-4.81) 
Oper_7 -27.895 -14.724 -17.843 -24.953 -9.789 -10.219 -19.518 
(-4.79) (-4.14) (-4.08) (-4.63) (-3.40) (-2.86) (-3.72) 
Oper_8 -12.595 -15.391 -13.467 -11.512 -21.460 -17.053 -21.738 
(-2.83) (-4.38) (-3.00) (-2.08) (-4.78) (-3.73) (-5.41) 
Oper_9 3.832 -16.959 -19.008 -24.165 -12.679 -28.139 -29.323 
(0.86) (-3.52) (-3.86) (-4.42) (-4.06) (-4.40) (-4.86) 
Oper_lO -10.974 -12.532 -14.820 -19.860 -12.158 -12.060 -28.990 
(-3.44) (-1.44) (-3.97) (-4.66) (-3.99) (-3.06) (-4.86) 
Oper_ll -29.fJ02 -18.236 -8.112 -11.735 -12.332 -20.753 -20.704 
(-4.90) (-4.81) (-2.12) (-3.82) (-3.78) (-4.73) (-5.44) 
Oper_l2 -27.457 -10.271 -20.315 -19.392 -19.921 -12.358 7.604 
(-4.62) (-3.42) (-4.43) (-4.fJO) (-3.32) (-3.22) (1.25) 
Oper_l3 -18.172 -23.044 -26.395 -10.643 -10.140 -28.356 -30.378 
(-4.66} (-3.88) (-4.27) (-3.74} (-2.75) (-4.56) (-5.03) 
Oper_l4 -22.479 -16.786 -9.439 -22.994 -12.631 -14.449 -18.242 
(-4.95} (-4.38} (-2.83) (-4.34} (-3.90) (-3.98) (-5.13) 
Oper_lS -17.498 -20.109 -14.466 -20.213 -8.557 -14.907 -8.851 
(-4.88} (-4.49} (-3.79) (-4.81) (-2.32} (-3.99} (-2.71) 
Oper_16 -29.611 -3.440 -28.000 -20.197 -23.879 -23.291 -23.632 
(-4.90) (-1.00) (-4.52) (-4.53) (-4.31) (-4.fJO) (-3.13) 
sigma**2 159.836 169.321 199.089 148.029 160.942 200.423 169322 
(7.38) (8.12) (6.90) (7.12) (8.28) (7.56) (7.30) 
log 
likelihood -955.13 -1105.5 -907.69 -904.73 1159.1 -98729 -94226 
N 1911 1960 2009 1862 1862 1862 1960 
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• The negative and significant coefficients of the short yast absence variable 
may be due to the disciplinary policy that limits the total amount of absence 
that can be taken without having a significant effect on the employee's 
career in the agency. 
• The winter and spring dummy variables are not significant ( except the 
spring in area 132), suggesting that absence in these seasons is not signifi-
cantly different from absence in the fall. However, the summer dummy vari-
able is positive and significant in three out of the seven garages, suggesting 
that in these garages operators tend to be absent more in the summer. 
Conclusions 
These estimation results suggest that absence is best interpreted as a habit, 
operators differ in their absence rates, and those who tend to be absent do so 
independent of whether or not they recently worked overtime. If there is some 
relationship, then those who tend to work overtime tend to be absent less. 
However, studies of absence are very complicated and the data that were 
available for this study do not resolve all of the potential problems. For exam-
ple, although the researchers classified absences into several categories, it is 
difficult to classify every absence correctly as either voluntary or involuntary. 
The researchers are also missing many potentially important data in the model 
such as nonlabor income and personal and family characteristics, especially 
financial needs and responsibilities. In addition, many operators (particularly 
junior ones) will not have the option of working overtime. As runs are chosen 
according to seniority, junior operators are more exposed to stress than senior 
operators. Senior operators have overtime available, but they are not exposed 
to the same level of stress as junior operators. Another explanation might be 
that, because of the relatively high operator wage rate at the MBTA, the 
income effect is stronger than the substitution effect and employees can afford 
to buy more leisure time independent of the overtime premium. 
If the hypothesis that absence is more a habit than the result of a decision 
process based on past overtime worked is accepted, then reducing overtime 
will not necessarily reduce absence, and the key to reducing absence is to 
develop a monitoring system that can identify employees who tend to be 
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absent. However, further research is recommended in this area, which should 
be based on more extensive data and more agencies. 
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